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In this paper we develop a DSGE model to analyze the welfare implications over
households that bank's asset recomposition might have. We model a representative bank
that potentially faces liquidity di±culties due to a mismatch between credits issued to
¯rms and deposits supplied by households. This bank has a portfolio consisting of loans
and bonds. The results show that positive liquidity shocks, driven by changes in the
household preferences, a®ect the bank's asset allocation decisions and are bene¯cial to
households. Similarly, when the bond's return rate increases, there is a substitution e®ect
that lowers the loan to bond ratio, but despite this, the bank's intermediation activity
increases inducing a positive e®ect over the household's welfare.
JEL classi¯cation numbers:D58,E32, E44.
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11 Introduction
Recently the function banks used to have as intermediaries of resources has lost relative im-
portance against investment fund functions. Financial innovation has promoted the incursion
of traditional banks into investment activities that in the past were managed by other ¯nan-
cial institutions 1. Although this integration resulted in important pro¯ts for a considerable
time span, it also caused problems since the exposure to market risk increased. The recent
international ¯nancial crisis clearly revealed the potential dangers of allowing banks perform
activities outside their main social ¯nancial intermediation function (Izquierdo and Talvi
(2010)). In spite of this, there is general consensus that fomenting the adequate usage of
¯nancial instruments to underpin di®erent types of risks, increases social welfare. In this
line, recent literature shows that ¯nancial innovation can be bene¯cial for agent's welfare
and concludes that exogenous shocks might be better tackled in an economy in which there
is diversity in the ¯nancial instruments used (Mullineux (2010), Palmerio (2009) and Arias
(2008)).
Although in Colombia banks are not allowed to invest directly in equities or in risky bonds,
they are able to have a portfolio based on government debt (TES). Theoretically since this
government bonds are more liquid 2, banks invest in them to ameliorate possible liquidity
issues derived from the loan-deposit mismatch. In practice, bond investments have become
an important source of revenue for banks. In the period between 2003 to 2006 their par-
ticipation in total revenue peaked , representing more than 20% of the bank's total income
(Banco de la Rep¶ ublica (2010)). Colombian data shows that there is an evident substitu-
tion e®ect between TES holdings and credit issuing (Figure 1). Monetary policy plays a
fundamental role in this substitution dynamic. In fact, the decrease in the Colombia's Cen-
tral Bank intervention rate that began on December 2008, has motivated banks to increase
their TES holdings, while loan's relative importance in the banks' portfolio has diminished.
Although during this period banks' pro¯ts grew due to the increase in value of government
bonds, their exposure to market risk has risen accordingly. A compulsory question surges;
is it bene¯cial to allow banks invest in bonds at the expense of reducing the credit supply in
the economy? The main purpose of this paper is to analyze how the tradeo® faced by banks
between investing in liquid bonds and less liquid commercial loans can a®ect households'
welfare.
We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in which a representa-
tive bank potentially faces liquidity di±culties due to a mismatch between credits issued to
¯rms and deposits supplied by households. In this model, ¯rms demand loans to invest in
1In developed economies it is common to have banks expand their businesses into investment bank markets,
having portfolios that include equities and risky bonds.
2A bank's portfolio in this kind of bonds is divided between the negotiable ones (which are the ones
considered in this paper) and the bond kept until maturity.
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capital. The bank faces a portfolio decision problem and maximizes a mean-variance utility
function. Following McCandless (2010) we measure the change in household's welfare by
computing its value function. Results show that positive liquidity shocks driven by changes
in the household preferences, a®ect bank's allocation decisions as well as its pro¯ts, and are
bene¯cial to households. Additionally, we ¯nd that an exogenous increase in the government
bond's return rate lowers the loan to bonds ratio but has a positive e®ect over household's
welfare since the amount of loans issued also grows.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the model used, section 3
shows the calibrated parameters that re°ect key steady state values and ratios of relevant
variables, section 4 explains the main results, and section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We suppose a closed economy without government. There are three types of homogenous
agents: households, banks, and ¯rms. Households own both banks and ¯rms. They supply
deposits to the former and labor to the latter. They also demand consumer goods, which
are produced by the ¯rm. On the other hand, banks demand deposits from households and
choose optimal levels of bonds and loans according to a mean-variance objective function.
Finally, ¯rms demand loans from the bank, to invest in physical capital. We suppose all
agents have rational expectations.
32.1 Household
The household seeks to maximize its expected discounted utility stream derived from con-
sumption ct and leisure n ¡ nt, where nt represent work hours. To accomplish this, the
household chooses its optimal consumption level, deposits and leisure, taking into account




t , the return on deposits (dt) from the previous period (1 + rd
t¡1)dt¡1, and wage
income wtnt. ¯h denotes the household's intertemporal discount factor and Á the substitu-
tion parameter associated with the tradeo® between leisure and consumption.The household
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Note that equation (2) represents the usual Euler equation and (3) equates the marginal
opportunity cost of leisure to its marginal bene¯t.
2.2 Bank
We suppose the bank is risk-averse and maximizes an expected discounted mean-variance
objective function. The bank knows the variance of the income derived from lending to ¯rms
and of the government bonds rate. We suppose that the bond return rate is at its expected
value, which is exogenously ¯xed at rm
t
3. The bank must satisfy the balance sheet equation
dt = lt + bt on every period, where dt denotes the deposits demanded, bt the amount of
government bonds and lt is loans supplied. We assume that the bank o®ers two-period loans
to the ¯rm at the beginning of each period, which are paid back at the end of the next
period. Since the bank must honor deposits, but receives loan payment with a one-period
3Assuming an exogenous bond return is equivalent to incorporating a government who ¯nances public
expenditure by issuing bonds and then transfers its expenditure to households through a lump-sum transfer.
4lag, it faces a liquidity issue when optimizing. The expected bank income is given by
¼b
t = (1 + rt¡1)2lt¡1 + rm
t bt ¡ rd
tdt ¡ lt:








l denotes the variance of the income derived from loans, ¾2
b the variance of the return























s. t. dt = lt + bt: (4)
First order conditions for problem (4) with respect to lt and bt are given by















Equation (5) shows that the marginal discounted pro¯ts of issuing commercial credits, should
be equal to the marginal risk of lending to ¯rms. Similarly, equation (6) tells the same story,
but for government bonds.
2.3 Firm
The ¯rm produces the good available for consumption using physical capital and labor. We
suppose that the production technology is a Cobb-Douglas function: F(n;K) = An®K1¡®
where K denotes physical capital stock, ® 2 (0;1) and A is a technological parameter. To
accumulate capital, which depreciates at a rate equal to ±, the ¯rm demands loans from the
bank at the beginning of each period and repays at the end of the following period. In this
way the ¯rm's pro¯ts are given by the following expression:






t ¡ wtnt ¡ (1 + rt¡1)2lt¡1;
where rt denotes the one period rate over the commercial loan. The ¯rm seeks to maximize
its expected discounted bene¯ts choosing optimal loan lt and labor demand nt and solving

















s. t. Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + lt: (7)














= (1 + rt)2: (9)
Equation (8) shows that in equilibrium the marginal product of labor is equal to is marginal
cost wt. Equation (9) show that the bene¯t for an additional unit of capital in the next
period should be the same as the investment cost (1 + rt)25.
3 Calibration
A period of the model corresponds to one year. The model is calibrated to match key steady-
state levels and ratios for Colombia, taking into account data from 2002 to 2009 (see Table
1). The calibrated parameters are summarized in Table 2.
To calibrate the average commercial loan return (r), we used the average real rate at which
banks supplied commercial loans (rc) as well as the non-performing loan ratio for this loan
portfolio (NPL).6 This data was supplied by the Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia.
For rd, we used the monthly real average term deposit rate, supplied by the Banco de la
Rep¶ ublica. Given the average of this rate from January 2002 to December 2009, 1.92%, we
5Note that rt represent the one period compound interest rate.
6Non-performing loans are de¯ned as those that are overdue more then 30 days. NPL is de¯ned as the
ratio between non-performing loans and the total loan portfolio.
6Table 1: Steady State Level and Ratios of Variables
Variable or Ratio Value Interpretation
r 6.98% Average commercial loan return
rd 1.92% Average deposit rate
n=n 20.79% Share of available time that household decides to work
l=b 3.38 Ratio between commercial loan portfolio and
Colombian public debt portfolio
Sources: Caicedo (2010), Banco de la Rep¶ ublica, P¶ erez-Reyna (2009), and Superintendencia Financiera de
Colombia. Authors' calculations.
Table 2: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Interpretation
A 33.43* Firm technology parameter
® 0.4753 Share of labor in ¯rm production function
¯b 0.9812* Bank discount factor, assumed to be equal to ¯h
¯f 0.9812* Firm discount factor, assumed to be equal to ¯h
¯h 0.9812 Household discount factor, equal to 1
1+rd by equation (2)
± 11.98% Capital depreciation
n 1* Household available time
Á 1.91 Share of leisure in household utility function,
calculated from equation (3)
rm 8.12% Average Colombian public debt return
½ 8 Bank risk aversion coe±cient
¾l 4.30% Variance of commercial loan return,
calculated from equation (5)
¾b 7.40% Variance of Colombian public debt return
¾l;b -0.06% Covariance between commercial loan return and
Colombian public debt return
Free parameters are denoted by *.
Sources: Caicedo and Estrada (2010), P¶ erez-Reyna (2009), Reveiz and Leon (2008), and Superintendencia
Financiera de Colombia. Authors' calculations.
had an estimate of the household discount factor (0.9812). We supposed this same value for
¯b and ¯f.
To calibrate n=n, we followed the process used in P¶ erez-Reyna (2009) and, as a result,
the average share of available time the household decides to work was set at 20.79%. We
normalized n to one. Finally we calibrates the ratio between commercial loan portfolio and
Colombian public debt portfolio to the observed monthly average ratio of these holdings for
banks since 2003. Its steady state value l=b was set to 3:38.
We established A = 33:43 so that ½ re°ect's an aversion coe±cient of 4. With respect to
®, we used the same value as in P¶ erez-Reyna (2009). The value of Á used is close to the
7share of leisure in the utility function of households in P¶ erez-Reyna (2009) and of saver
households in Caicedo and Estrada (2010).
For rm we calculated the average monthly real return of the Colombian public debt index
constructed in Reveiz and Leon (2008) 7. Using this series we calibrated ¾b and ¾l;b to
re°ect observed variance of the index return and covariance between the return of this index
and commercial loan return.
4 Results
To analyze the implications on households of asset substitution by banks, we decided to
perform two exercises. First we shocked parameters that a®ect household's decision for
supplying deposits. In this way we could analyze the behavior of the modeled economy
when it faces changes in liquidity. Then, we considered a shock on the bond¶s return rm to
study policy changes that could a®ect the public debt market. For example one can associate
an increase in the return in bonds with a decrease int the central bank¶s intervention rate.
Likewise a shock on rm can also be mapped with changes in public debt supply.
Additionally we compared the value function of the household under the shocks, with their
value function in the absence of shocks. In this way we could analyze the impact of the
di®erent shocks, and how optimal decisions made by the bank a®ects the representative
household8.
We supposed that agents' expectations of Á, ¯h and rm
t behave according to the following
¯rst order autoregressive processes:
e Át = ¸Áe Át¡1 + "
Á
t
f ¯ht = ¸¯hf ¯ht¡1 + "
¯h
t ; (10)






t gt and f"rm
t gt are sequences of independent and identically normally dis-
tributed errors with variance equal to 1 and mean equal to 0. In (10) e Át, f ¯ht and f rmt denote
the percentage deviation of Át, (¯h)t and rm
t , with respect to their steady state values . Using




t by 1% and "rm
t by 10%9.
7We would like to thank these authors for supplying the series of this index.
8Concretely, using Matlab
r based toolbox Dynare
r we estimated a second order approximation of the
equations of the model.
9We considered shocks that lasted for 20 periods. That is, that after 20 periods variables are su±ciently
close to their steady state values. Because equations were approximated using a second order Taylor ap-
84.1 Liquidity Shock
Although changes in Á or ¯h do not a®ect liquidity available in the economy in a direct
way, they do indirectly through the household's consumption and labor supply decisions.
Intuitively these shocks could be related to periods of time where consumption decreases its
importance for households due to a higher share of leisure in the household's utility function,
or to lower urge to consume10.
An increase in Á causes leisure to have a higher share in the household's utility function.
Therefore the price of leisure, w, increases. This causes both a reduction in consumption
and in labor supply (Figure 2). Also, deposit supply decreases, which results in a higher
deposit rate.
On the other hand, lower labor supply implies a reduction in production. As a consequence
loan demand decreases as well, causing a lower equilibrium credit interest rate. Nonetheless,
since the fourth period after the shock loan demand increases, as well as its equilibrium rate.
Finally, lower production, with higher prevailing rates causes a decrease in pro¯ts.
Since loan demand decreases, banks lower its ratio of loans to bonds in the shock's period.
However, since deposits decreased, so does bonds demand, only in lesser degree than loans.
Nevertheless, increasing loan's demand in the following periods results in increasing bank's
exposure to the ¯rm. Finally, an increment in the rate di®erential between credit and deposit
rate is the main reason why bank's pro¯ts decrease from the second period after the shock,
even though pro¯ts increased in the ¯rst period due to the past debt paid by the ¯rm.
A shock causing an increase in ¯h a®ects intertemporal decisions for the household. Since
future consumption and leisure weights more in its expected discounted utility stream, the
household reduces its consumption and increases its labor supply. A lesser consumption level
and higher labor income allows an increase in deposit supply, along with a reduction in the
equilibrium deposit rate (Figure 3).
The increase in resources causes the bank to augment both its loan supply and bond demand.
However, a higher increase in loan supply than in demand has as a consequence a lower
equilibrium interest rate. Due to this, banks change their asset composition to be more
exposed to bonds than to ¯rms. Nonetheless the increase in assets, liquidity issues regarding
the lag between supplying loans and receiving its interest payments cause that bank bene¯ts




t deviation would be smaller than ² = (0:01)
3. In this
way, we calibrated ¸
Á and ¸
¯h so that after 20 periods variables would be have a deviation with respect to
their steady state variables of less than ².Therefore we assumed ¸
Á = ¸
¯h = 0:01





10Note that the results might depend on the fact that we are only considering commercial loans due to
the fact that they represent the most signi¯cant portion of total loans for the colombian case. Future work
should focus in including other types of loans in order to check the robustness of the results found in this
article.
9Figure 2: Percentage Change of Variables with Respect to Their Steady State
Values after a Shock on "Á











































































decrease in the ¯rst period after the shock. From the second period on, bene¯ts are higher
than their steady state value.
Finally ¯rms increase their production due to higher investment in capital and more available
labor resources. However increasing labor costs cause bene¯ts to decrease during the second
period after the shock, only to increase afterwards.
As a conclusion, both shocks have an impact on liquidity and hence, on the bank's decision to
allocate resources between loans and bonds. An increase in Á is associated to lesser available
liquidity, while an increase in ¯h causes the contrary.The fact that loans are less liquid than
bonds is re°ected on the lagged behavior in some of the analyzed variables. In particular, the
impact of both shocks over the bank's bene¯ts is opposite between the ¯rst and the second
period after each shock. This suggests that banks bu®er the liquidity shock mainly with its
pro¯ts.
10Figure 3: Percentage Change of Variables with Respect to Their Steady State
Values after a Shock on "¯h















































































4.2 Bond Return Shock
To analyze the asset recomposition of the bank in case a market event occurred, we modeled
an exogenous increase in rm. In a real life economy, an increase in bond return could be a
consequence of, for example, a decrease in the central bank's intervention rate. Additionally,
an increase in bond supply caused by higher liquidity needs by the government could cause
the opposite e®ect: a lower bond return. Consequences of this last event would be somewhat
opposite to the ones shown in Figure 4.
Since bonds have higher return, the bank substitutes loans for bonds in its balance sheet.
To seize the higher pro¯tability, the bank's demand for deposits and rd increase. Since loans
are less liquid, their supply increases with a lag causing a lower equilibrium rate in the credit
market. Thus the intermediation margin, de¯ned as the gap between credit and deposit rate,
tightens.
The increase in loan's supply from the second period after the shock translates into a higher
production and capital stock level. However, since decreasing loan rates bene¯t the ¯rm
11Figure 4: Percentage Change of Variables with Respect to Their Steady State
Values after a Shock on "rm














































































with a lag, it is only after the ¯fth period that the ¯rms bene¯ts are higher than their steady
state value.
Since deposits increase,the household's consumption decreases right after the shock. Nonethe-
less, the higher return of deposits in subsequent periods allows the household to consume
more afterwards simultaneously with an increase in leisure.
In conclusion, an increase in bond's return induce substitution between the bank's assets.
However, there is also an increase in loan supply due to higher resources available from
deposits, although with a lag. In this model this suggests that the fact that banks perform
functions other than intermediation of resources may not necessarily have a negative e®ect
on households, since it increases bank's demand for deposits.11
11Although with a di®erent modeling scheme, in Saade and P¶ erez (2009) regulatory changes leading to
greater liquidity in the economy also cause the intermediation margin to shorten.
124.3 Implications on Household
The impulse-response functions shown in sections 4.1 and 4.2 re°ect the consequence of the
analyzed shocks on the relevant variables of the model. However, to study the e®ect of these
shocks on households, we considered their discounted utility stream in a situation with and
without the shocks.
More formally, let b C(") = fb ct(")g1
t=0 and b N(") = fb nt(")g1
t=0 be optimal consumption and
labor streams for the 20 periods that lasts the shock on ", where " 2 f"Á;"¯h;"rm
g. On the
other hand, let c and n be the steady state values. Similarly, let b B(") = fc ¯ht(")g1
t=0 and
b ©(") = fb Át(")g1
t=0 be the streams of ¯f and Á under a shock on ", where " 2 f"Á;"¯h;"rm
g.
Now for " 2 f"Á;"¯h;"rm
g we de¯ne













f [lnc + Áln(n ¡ n)] =
1
1 ¡ ¯h
[lnc + Áln(n ¡ n)];
where c ¯ht(") 2 b B("), b Át 2 b ©("), b ct(") 2 b C("), and b nt(") 2 b N(") for all t ¸ 1. In (11) b V (") is
the household's discounted utility stream under the shocks, while V is its objective function
in the absence of shocks.
Since the shocks were calibrated so that the deviation of the variables after 20 periods are
su±ciently close to their steady state values, the ¯rst equation in (11) can be approximated
by






lnb ct(") + b Át(")ln(n ¡ b nt("))
i
+ ¯20V: (12)
Then we compare b V (") for " 2 f"Á;"¯h;"rm
g with V . Main results are shown in Table 3.
Results suggest that available liquidity in the economy may have positive consequences on
households. In this way, an increase in Á, which causes lower deposit supply, results in a
lower values for the household's Value function. On the other hand, both an increase in ¯h
and a higher bond return augmented the discounted stream of utility for the household.
Even though an increase in rm causes asset substitution in the bank's balance sheet, which
resulted in a lower loans to bonds ratio than in steady state, the increment in deposit's
demand ultimately translates into higher loan supply. This way households are better o®
with higher deposit returns, and the ¯rm and the bank bene¯ts transfer to them. This result
13suggests that although banks may have other options to allocate their resources does not
necessarily imply the reduction in their credit supply.
Table 3: Change in Value Function after a Shock on "Á, "¯h and "rm






Nonetheless, the previous results need to be analyzed more thoroughly. The fact the value
function under all three shocks has a very similar value to the one under steady state, this
re°ects that ultimately the shocks' impact on the household's are somehow marginal12. In all
three cases only the bank's bene¯ts and its asset composition su®ered signi¯cative deviations
from their steady state values. In this way shocks would be needed to be su±ciently big for
the value function to have signi¯cant changes.
It is worth noting that the fact that neither consumption nor labor supply decisions had
important variations after the shocks, may be of modeling representative households. In the
real economy, not every household would own banks and ¯rms. Hence, if the model is ex-
tended an heterogenous households considered, the impact of the shocks on their discounted
streams could be signi¯cant. Nonetheless, aggregated results should not be very di®erent.
5 Concluding Remarks
The model developed in this paper is a simple ¯rst step to analyze the welfare implications
of banks asset allocation decisions. The model is a contribution to current literature since
it considers possible liquidity di±culties due to the loans deposit maturity mismatch, and
therefore justi¯es the natural role that liquid bonds have in a bank's balance sheet. Two
speci¯c characteristics of the banking assets are considered: liquidity and volatility of re-
turns. Bonds represent liquid assets, with high average return but also imply more volatility;
whereas commercial credits are modeled as two period assets that have a lower return rate
and volatility.
The results show that positive liquidity shocks change the bank's loans bonds ratio decision
and have an aggregate positive e®ect over household's welfare. Similarly, when the return
rate of bond is increased, both loans and credits increase, resulting bene¯cial to households.
12This is closely related to near steady state approximation approach adopted in this paper. If one wants
to study out of steady state dynamics a di®erent methodology we highly recommend reading Aiyagari (1994)
and Diaz-Gim¶ enez et al. (2010).
14Although these results shed some light to the questions presented above, the e®ect of liquidity
and market shocks over household's decision is mild. This is partly due to the local around
the steady state analysis carried out in this paper. Future works should focus in this issue
and determine out of steady state dynamics, in order to analyze the e®ect of large shocks
over the model's parameters. Additionally, the impulse response functions showed that
there is an ampli¯cation e®ect of the parameters' shocks over the bank's decision variables
and especially over its pro¯ts. Extensions of the current model should emphasis the role
of liquidity concerns and its relation with regulatory policies, such as solvency ratios and
capital requirements. Also one could focus on explicit monetary policy objectives and its
in°uence over bank's asset recomposition.
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